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Value-based choices are influenced both by risk in potential outcomes and by whether outcomes reflect potential gains or losses. These
variables are held to be related in a specific fashion, manifest in risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. Instead, we hypothe-
sized that there are independent impacts of risk and loss on choice such that, dependingon context, subjects can showeither risk aversion
for gains and risk seeking for losses or the exact opposite.We demonstrate this independence in a gambling task, by selectively reversing
a loss-inducedeffect (causingmoregambling for gains than losses and the reverse)while leaving riskaversionunaffected.Consistentwith
these dissociable behavioral impacts of risk and loss, fMRI data revealed dissociable neural correlates of these variables, with parietal
cortex tracking risk and orbitofrontal cortex and striatum tracking loss. Based on our neural data, we hypothesized that risk and loss
influence action selection through approach–avoidancemechanisms, a hypothesis supported in an experiment inwhichwe showvalence
and risk-dependent reaction time effects in line with this putative mechanism. We suggest that in the choice process risk and loss can
independently engage approach–avoidance mechanisms. This can provide a novel explanation for how risk influences action selection
and explains both classically described choice behavior as well as behavioral patterns not predicted by existing theory.
Introduction
Risk influences value-based choice in humans (Harrison and Rut-
stro¨m, 2008) and other animals (Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996).
Whether outcomes entail gains or losses (i.e., their valence) also
influences behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In psychology
andeconomics, theprevailing viewof the relationshipbetween these
twovariables is that outcomevalencedetermines the effect of risk on
choice, specifically leading to risk aversion for gains but risk seeking
for losses. This relationship is a foundation stone in prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and has been related to the psycho-
physical idea of diminishing marginal sensitivity (Weber and John-
son,2008). It isalsosupportedbyclassicexperimental findings(Tversky
andKahneman, 1981; Camerer, 1989) and is used to explain phenom-
ena such as why stock market traders hold losing stocks for too long
(risk seeking) and sell winners too early (risk aversion) (Camerer,
1998). Here, we reexamine this dominant view of the relationship
between risk and valence (i.e., risk aversionwith gains and risk seek-
ing with losses), and ask what are the likely biological mechanisms
supporting the influence of these variables on choice.
Recent findings question the standard view of the relationship
between risk and valence, for example in reports of risk aversion
for gains but risk neutrality (not the predicted risk seeking) with
losses (Laury and Holt, 2005). A plausible alternative hypothesis
is that the valence and risk of economic stimuli exert independent
influences on choice. Such independence not only allows for
greater gamblingwith losses than gains as reported classically, but
also similar gambling for each (Laury and Holt, 2005), or even
greater gambling for gains than losses. Our first aim was to be-
haviorally test this hypothesis of independent risk and valence
effects, which we sought to dissociate bymanipulating task struc-
ture (Experiments 1 and 2) and exploiting interindividual differ-
ences (Experiment 3). We define risk as outcome variance as is
standard in finance (Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts, 2010).
A hypothesis of independent risk and valence effects was also
motivated by evidence that competing neural valuation systems in-
fluence choice (Dayan, 2008). Processing of risk and valence by dis-
tinct neural systems would be more consistent with independent
rather than linked behavioral effects. Candidate neural regions me-
diating sucheffects include theorbitofrontal cortex (OFC)and stria-
tum implicated in loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007), as well as insula
(Preuschoff et al., 2006) and parietal cortex (Platt and Glimcher,
1999; Huettel et al., 2005) implicated in risk. Thus, our second aim
was to use fMRI to determine whether there was a neural dissocia-
tion in processing of stimulus risk and valence (Experiment 4).
A neurobiological perspective also enabled us to ask a third
important question, namely how risk and valence influence ac-
tion selection. One possibility is that these variables modulate
values ascribed to actions by more goal-directed systems. Alter-
natively, theymight act as appetitive or aversive stimulus features
and influence a disposition to approach or avoid stimuli, in line
with existing evidence that such approach–avoidance mecha-
nisms underlie a variety of biases in humans and animals (Dayan,
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2008; Guitart-Masip et al., 2010). We tested for these hypotheses
in our neural data, and behaviorally in Experiments 5 and 6.
Materials andMethods
We report six independent experiments, in whichwe used a choice task that
enables an independent manipulation of risk (measured as variance) and
valence (gainsor losses) inoutcomes.Wedeveloped twovariants of our task,
comprising an “accept/reject” and a “selection” task. Experiment 1 assayed
behavior in the accept/reject task and Experiment 2 in the selection task. In
Experiment 3, participants undertook the accept/reject task on two separate
days (1–3dapart;mean, 2d), receiving feedbackandpaymenton the second
day. Experiment 4 examined brain activity during the accept/reject task us-
ing fMRI. Finally, we tested reaction times (RTs) in the accept/reject (Exper-
iments 5) and selection (Experiment 6) variants of the task. University
College London Ethics Committee approved the study.
Participants
A total of 143 healthy participants in all took part after providing informed
consent. The participant details per experimentwere as follows: Experiment
1 (n16;mean age, 26 years; range, 19–70; 6males), Experiment 2 (n24;
mean, 23 years; range, 18–34; 3 males), Experiment 3 (n  28; mean, 27
years; range, 19–62; 13males), Experiment 4 (n22;mean, 22 years; range,
18–32; 6 males; 3 further participants excluded due to fMRI artifacts), Ex-
periment 5 (n 19; mean, 23 years; range, 19–31; 6males; 1 further partic-
ipant excluded as they only rejected), and Experiment 6 (n 34; mean, 24
years; range, 19–36; 16 males; 1 further participant excluded who confused
the buttons). Note that 8 of the 121 subjects in our behavioral experiments
were aged over 32 years, and excluding these subjects does not alter the
findings in any of our experiments.
Task
Accept/reject task (Experiments 1, 3, and 4). In the accept/reject task (see
Fig. 1), participants performed 200 trials presented in a random order, of
which 100 were “gain trials” (all possible outcomes 0) and 100 were
“loss trials” (all outcomes0). In each trial, participants chose to accept
or reject a lottery (four possible outcomes) compared with a sure option
(£6 in gain trials; £6 in loss trials). Each trial began with a fixation cross
presented for 1–2 s (mean, 1.5 s), followed by viewing the options for
4020ms; and finally a black square appeared to indicate participants had
1500 ms to input their choice by button press (the black square turned
white when they chose). If participants did not respond, they received £0
on a gain trial and the maximum loss possible on a loss trial (£12).
Our decision variables of interest were risk and valence. We manipu-
lated risk by using a set of 100 lotteries (four possible outcomes, all0;
see Fig. 1b) in which we parametrically and orthogonally manipulated
the degree of risk (variance; 10 levels) and expected value (EV) (10 lev-
els). One-half of the set of lotteries had an EV above and one-half below
the sure amounts, with careful matching of the lotteries above and below
the sure amount. We presented each lottery in this set once to give 100
gain trials. Tomanipulate valence, wemultiplied all outcome amounts by
1 to give 100 loss trials (i.e., all outcomes 0, and a sure option of
£6). This created a set of gain trials and a set of loss trials that were
perfectly matched in their parametric modulations of risk and EV.
Participants began the day with an endowment of £12. After the ex-
periment, one gain trial and one loss trial were picked at random and
their outcomes were added to this endowment to determine a final pay-
ment. Participants could receive between £0 and £24. In Experiment 3, in
which participants undertook the task on 2 separate days, they received
feedback and payment after the second attendance. In Experiment 4, in
which we used fMRI, all amounts were doubled.
Selection task (Experiment 2). This variant aimed to change how indi-
viduals were influenced by valence (see Fig. 1). It was identical with the
accept/reject task except that, whereas on every trial in the accept/reject
task, individuals evaluated a lottery and accepted or rejected; in this
variant, individuals evaluated two lotteries and selected between them.
To manipulate risk, we again generated a set of 100 gain trials, in which
we parametrically and orthogonally manipulated the difference in risk
(10 levels of variance) and EV (10 levels) between the two lotteries (each
with two possible outcomes, all 0). To manipulate valence, we multi-
plied all amounts by1 to give 100 loss trials that were perfectlymatched
with the gain trials in their parametric manipulations of risk and EV.
Free response period tasks (Experiments 5 and 6). Experiment 5 used the
accept/reject task, and Experiment 6 used the selection task. These were
exactly as described above, except that individuals could choose at any
point during the 5520 ms for which the stimuli were presented (a black
square was present throughout stimulus presentation and turned white
when they chose).
Stimulus sets
Accept/reject task. For our accept/reject task, we generated a set of 100
gain trials (ARMainList), in which we manipulated the difference in vari-
ance (Var; 10 levels) and EV (EV; 10 levels) of the lottery relative to
the sure option of £6 (see Fig. 1b). We created this stimulus set in two
stages. First, we generated a list of every possible trial within the following
constraints: each lottery had four outcomes (i.e., four pie chart seg-
ments); outcomes were between £0 and £12, to militate against possible
probability distortion effects at small probabilities (Kahneman andTver-
sky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992); the smallest allowable proba-
bility was 0.1; the smallest allowable probability increment was 0.05; and
we controlled for lottery skewness. Second, from within this very large
number of potential trials, we selected our set of 100 trials that were the
closest match to our desired 10 levels of Var and 10 levels of EV.
We used ARMainList in Experiments 1 (behavioral), 4 (fMRI), and 5 (free
response time). However, to check that our behavioral findings were not
caused by characteristics of this specific lottery set, in Experiment 3 we also
compared the ARMainList to two alternative sets. In Experiment 3, 11 of 28
subjects used ARMainList (maximumEV, 1.25;maximumVar, 23.9), and
the remainder used one of two stimulus sets generated in the same way but
with new lotteries and without skewness controlled [11 participants used
ARAlternateList1 (maximum EV, 1.35; maximum Var, 23.8), and 6 partic-
ipants used ARAlternateList2 (maximum EV, 2.70; maximum Var, 23.8)].
As the lottery set used did not affect the behavioral findings, we collapsed
across lottery sets in Experiment 3.
Selection task. For the selection task, we generated a set of 100 gain
trials in the same way, although here manipulating the difference in EV
(10 levels) and variance (10 levels) between two lotteries (each with two
possible outcomes,0). The difference in EV and variance between the
options (maximum EV, 1.9; maximum Var, 18.3) was similar to that
used in the accept/reject task.
Calculation of EV, variance, and skewness. For a given lottery with N
potential outcomes (m1,m2, . . .mN), with probabilities p p1, p2, . . . pN,
we define the EV, variance (Var), and standardized skewness (Skw) of the
outcome distribution as follows:
EV  
n1
N
mnPn (1)
Var  
n1
N
mn  EV
2Pn (2)
Skw 

n1
N
mn  EV
3Pn
Var3/2
. (3)
Statistical analysis
All statistical tests used were two-tailed.
Reaction time analysis
Wenormalizedeach individual’sRTsby taking thenatural logarithm,mean-
correcting, and dividing by the SD. However, our findings were the same
regardless of using “raw” or normalized RTs. Due to a coding error, RTs are
not reported for Experiments 1 and 3. Regression analysis on participants’
RT data was conducted using the glmfit function inMATLAB.
Behavioral modeling
Wemodeled behavior in our accept/reject task, estimatingmodel param-
eters on a single-subject level usingmaximum-likelihood analysis imple-
mented in MATLAB. We compared models with different utility
functions, using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Our model-
based analysis of participants’ choices sought to determine whether our
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decision variables of interest, risk and valence, influence choice. It also
provided a trial-by-trial metric of risk for use in our fMRI analysis, and
allowed us to ask whether our behavioral findings can be explained by
probability distortion or choice randomness. In all our models, on each
trial the subjective values (or utilities,U ) of both options were computed
using one of the utility functions below.
Impacts of risk and valence on choice.We compared threemodels to ask
whether behavior was influenced by risk and valence. First, in a very
simple mean-only model (Mn_Only), individuals only cared about the
mean of the options as follows:
U  Mean. (4)
Second, we asked whether choice was also influenced by risk, using a
mean–variance model (Mn_Var). Specifically, risk is measured as vari-
ance. Here,  is a free parameter reflecting an individual’s preference for
variance, where a risk-neutral individual has   0; risk-averse,   0;
and risk-seeking,  0, as follows:
U  Mean  *Variance. (5)
Third, we asked whether both risk and valence influence choice, using a
mean–variance–valence model (Mn_Var_Val). There is a gain parame-
ter that reflects risk preference in gain trials and a loss parameter reflect-
ing risk preference in loss trials. To preempt our results, this was the
winning model in all six of the datasets as follows:
U  Mean  *Variance, (6)
where  gain for mean 0;  loss for mean 0.
Expected utility model. In addition to these models described above, we
asked whether our data could be explained with a standard power utility
model commonly used to model expected utility (Camerer, 2003). This
model incorporates the impact of risk on choice, using a free parameter,
, that reflects the concavity of the utility function and therefore the
degree of risk aversion as follows:
U  
n1
N mn1Pn
1  
. (7)
Prospect theorymodel.Wefurther tested autility functionderived frompros-
pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which in addition to the power
utility function described above also incorporates the effects of valence and
probability weighting. Here, the parameter  reflects the degree of loss aver-
sion, and the parameter 	 reflects probability distortion implemented with
the Prelec probability weighting function (Prelec, 1998). We implemented
twoversionsof thismodel. First,weused a referencepoint of zero,whichhas
the virtue of simplicity with negative numbers coded as losses and positive
numbers as gains, and this reference point is also equivalent to their expec-
tation on arriving at the laboratory (it would result in their receiving the
endowment of £12). Second, we used the sure amount in each trial as the
reference point, such that all the trials become “mixed gambles.” However,
wenote that using the sure amount as the referencepoint turns the set of 100
gain trials and the set of 100 loss trials into two essentially identical sets of
mixed gambles. This predicts choice should be the same with both sets, and
therefore the model cannot explain our new finding of greater gambling in
the gain trials compared with the loss trials in the accept/reject task or the
reverse in the selection task.
U  
n1
N mn1	n
1  
if m  0 (8)
U  
n1
N mn1 	n
1  
if m 
 0 (9)
where 	n  e
ln Pn	. (10)
Cumulative prospect theory. Finally, we tested a cumulative prospect
theory model (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), which in its probability
weighting uses rank ordering and cumulative probabilities. For a
given lottery with N potential outcomes, we redefine outcomes rela-
tive to a reference point R, such that the outcomes are mT, mT
1,
mT
2. . . , R,. . . mN2, mN1, mN, with probabilities p  pT,
pT
1, pT
2. . . , pR, . . . pN2, pN1, pN. Overall utility, U  U
 

UR 
 U
, is given as follows:
Form R:
U
  gpNumN  1N gj0k PNj
 gj0k1 PNjumNk; (11)
Form R:
U  gprumT  k1T gj0T PT
j
 gj0k1 PT
jumT
k; (12)
Form R:
UR  0 (13)
umi  
 R  mi

1  
mi 
 R
mi  R

1  
mi  R
(14)
gPi   eln Pi mi  Reln Pi mi  R . (15)
Noise in choice. In all our models, on each trial the subjective value, or
utilities (U), of both options (denoted hereA andB)was computed using
a utility function. These values were compared with generate a trial-by-
trial probability of accepting the lottery, using a softmax function with a
free parameter  (constrained between 0 and 20) that allows for noise in
action selection as follows:
PA 
1
1  eUAUB
(16)
Finally, we asked whether valence acted by changing choice randomness.
To the best fitting of the models above, we replaced the single free pa-
rameter in our softmax decision rule with separate parameters for gain
trials (gain) and loss trials (loss).
Model fitting and comparison.We fit data on an individual participant
basis. We estimated best-fitting model parameters using maximum-
likelihood analysis. Optimization was implemented with a nonlinear
Nelder–Mead simplex search algorithm in MATLAB. We compared
models using group Bayes factors, with the BIC penalizing model com-
plexity (Schwarz, 1978).
Experiment 4: fMRI of the accept/reject task
fMRI data acquisition. In a 3T Allegra scanner (Siemens), each partici-
pant underwent one functional run (515 volumes), acquired using a
gradient-echo EPI sequence (46 transverse slices; TR, 2.76 s; TE, 30 ms;
3 3 mm in-plane resolution; 2 mm slice thickness; 1 mm gap between
adjacent slices; z-shim, 0.4 mT/m; positive phase encoding direction;
slice tilt, 30°) optimized for OFC and amygdala. We acquired a T1-
weighted anatomical scan and local field maps.
fMRI data analysis. Functional data were analyzed using standard proce-
dures inSPM8(StatisticalParametricMapping;www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
fMRI time series were regressed onto a composite general linear model
(GLM). The GLM contained boxcars for the length of time the lottery was
displayed (5.5 s) to examine the decision-making process. Delta functions
were also included for button presses, lottery onset to account for visual
stimulus presentation, and for trials in which subjects failed to respond.We
modeled our neuroimaging data using a 2 valence (gain, loss)  2 choice
(accept, reject) design. Additional parametric modulators were included,
with theheightof theboxcarmodulatedby theEVandvarianceof the lottery
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on each trial. The delta functions and boxcars
were convolved with the canonical hemody-
namic response function.
We report all activations at p 0.05 that sur-
vivewhole-brain correctionusing family-wise er-
ror at the cluster level (Friston et al., 2004), unless
otherwise stated. Clusters were defined using a
threshold of p 0.005. For presentation, images
are displayed at p  0.001, uncorrected. Unless
otherwise stated, small-volume correction (p 
0.05) was for a sphere of 10 mm radius around
stated coordinates. For the contrast of loss 
gain, we also used small-volume correction (p
0.05) in anatomical regions of interest (amygdala
and anterior insula) specified in the PickAtlas
toolbox (Maldjian et al., 2003). Conjunction
analyses were performed using the SPM8 con-
junction null function (Friston et al., 2005).
In addition to using lottery variance (a key
component of our winning behavioralmodel) as
a parametric modulator in our imaging analysis,
we analyzed our imaging data with three further
GLMs. Instead of the EV parametric regressor,
these GLMs used parametric regressors based on
the subjective values (i.e., utilities) derived from
our winning behavioral model. Specifically, one
model used the subjective value of the lottery; a
second used the chosenminus unchosen subjec-
tivevalue; anda thirdmodelused thechosensub-
jective value [this third model used a two choice
(accept, reject) design for the onset regressors of
interest to enable model estimation]. For each
model, we first tested for whole-brain-corrected
activity as above, and then in amore liberal anal-
ysis used small-volume correction (p 0.05) for
a sphere of 10mmradius centeredonany activity
identified in regions previously linked to value
computations (Kable and Glimcher, 2007)—
specifically medial prefrontal, orbitofrontal, and
posterior cingulate cortex definedusing thePick-
Atlas toolbox as above, and ventral striatum de-
fined using a 15 mm sphere centered around
peak coordinates for positive stimuli from
O’Doherty et al. (2004).
Results
Reversing the effect of valence
independently of risk aversion
To behaviorally dissociate risk- and
valence-induced influences on choice,
we developed two variants of our task with different formats:
the accept/reject task and the selection task. We first examined
behavior in our accept/reject task (Experiment 1, n  16; Fig.
1) (see Materials andMethods). In each gain trial, participants
chose to accept a lottery (all outcomes0) or reject the lottery
and so receive £6 for certain. Across the set of 100 gain trials,
we parametrically manipulated the degree of risk in the lottery
(using 10 levels of variance) and orthogonally manipulated its
EV (10 levels) (Fig. 1b). One-half of the lotteries had an EV
above the sure amount and one-half below (mean EV across all
100 lotteries was equal to the sure option), which provided a
simple metric of risk preference indexed as the proportion of
riskier choices made (PropRisk; risk-neutral, 0.5; risk-averse,
0.5; risk-seeking, 0.5). To manipulate valence, we created
100 perfectly matched loss trials by multiplying all amounts in
our gain trials by 1 (Fig. 1c).
In our accept/reject task (Experiment 1, n  16; Fig. 1), risk
influenced choice overall, with individuals being averse to risk
[PropRiskall, 0.40 0.15 (SD); one-sample t test vs risk-neutral,
t(15)2.9, p 0.01; Fig. 1d]. This degree of risk aversion (i.e.,
on average, accepting gambles with EV of approximately £6.50 vs
the sure amount of £6) is in keeping with the magnitude of risk
aversion seen previously using tasks thatmeasure risk preferences
(Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008). We also
extracted a simple metric for the impact of valence on choice
from the difference in riskier choices in each domain (ImpVa-
lence PropRiskgain PropRiskloss). Individuals were also sen-
sitive to valence (ImpValence, 0.11  0.17; one-sample t test vs
no effect of valence, t(15) 2.6, p 0.019). Strikingly, and against
a prevailing expectation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992), individuals gambled more for gain [Pro-
pRiskgain, 0.46 0.18 (SD)] compared with loss outcomes [Pro-
pRiskloss, 0.35 0.14 (SD); t(15) 2.6, p 0.019]. We precisely
Figure 1. Dissociating valence and risk related influences using task design. a–d refer to the accept/reject task. a, In each gain
trial, individuals chose to accept a lottery (4 possible outcomes, all0) or reject and so receive £6 for certain. b, We created a set
of 100 gain trials that parametrically and orthogonallymanipulated the degree of risk (defined as outcome variance; 10 levels) and
EV (10 levels) of the lotteries. One-half of the lotteries had an EV above the sure amount and one-half below, metricating risk
preference as theproportionof riskier choices (PropRisk; risk-averse,0.5; risk-neutral, 0.5; risk-seeking,0.5). c,Multiplyingall
gain trial amounts by1 gave 100 loss trials with identical parametric manipulations. All 200 trials were presented in random
order. d, Behavior in the accept/reject task (Experiment 1, n 16). Individuals were risk averse overall (i.e., PropRiskall,0.5).
Valence also influenced choice, withmore gambling for gains than losses (ImpValence PropRiskgain PropRiskloss). e–g refer
to the selection task, in which again there were as follows: 100 gain trials with parametric and orthogonal manipulation of
difference in risk and EV between the two options (e); and 100 loss trials created bymultiplying the gain trial amounts by1 (f ).
However, here in each trial individuals were presented with two lotteries to consider and select between. g, Behavior in the
selection task (Experiment 2, n 24): risk aversion overall was unaltered compared with the accept/reject task (i.e., PropRiskall,
0.5), but the direction of the valence effect was completely reversed. Error bars show SEM. *p 0.05; **p 0.005.
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replicate these findings in Experiments 3 and 4 using the accept/
reject task (Fig. 2). Previous work has reported a reduced differ-
ence in gambling between gains and losses (Laury and Holt,
2005), but such greater gambling for gains than losses has not, to
our knowledge, been previously reported.
We next sought tomodify our task to replicate classic findings
of greater gambling for losses than gains (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). One possible source of
difference is the format in which decisions are presented, as illus-
trated by comparing our accept/reject task with the problems
used in the classic paper establishing prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). In the former, each trial presented a different
lottery to accept or reject, while in the latter each problem pre-
sented two options for individuals to select between. We there-
fore modified the task format to create a new selection task
(Experiment 2, n  24; Fig. 1) (see Materials and Methods).
Again, there were 100 gain trials with parametric modulation of the
difference in risk and EV between the two
options in each trial, and 100 loss trials. As
before, the proportion of riskier choices in-
dexes risk preference (PropRiskall), and the
difference in riskier choices between do-
mains indexes the impact of valence (Im-
pValence). Crucially, however, in the
selection task in each trial individuals were
presentedwith two lotteries to consider and
select between. Relative to our accept/reject
task, we aimed to selectively reverse the ef-
fect from loss aversion, but leave the overall
risk-induced effect unchanged.
As predicted, risk aversion overall was
the same in the selection (PropRiskall,
0.420.11) as in the accept/reject task (p
0.4 for independent-sample t tests against
PropRiskall in Experiments 1, 3, or 4). Fur-
thermore, the magnitude of the valence ef-
fect was the same in the selection task
(ImpValence, 0.16  0.25) as in the ac-
cept/reject task (p  0.3 for independent-
sample t tests against the ImpValence in
Experiments 1, 3, or 4). However, the direction of this valence effect
was now reversed, such that individuals selected the riskier option
more for losses (PropRiskloss, 0.50 0.17) than gains (PropRiskgain,
0.34 0.16; t(23) 3.1, p 0.005). Thus,wedissociated the impacts
of risk and loss on choice in a simple gambling task manifest in a
reversal in direction of a valence-induced effect (not just attenuating
it as shown previously), but leaving an overall risk-induced effect
unchanged.
Behavioral modeling
Model-based analysis of our data confirmed that choice was best
predicted bymodels incorporating the influences of both risk and
valence (Fig. 3). In each of the six experiments in this study (using
either the accept/reject or selection tasks; total n 143), a mean–
variance–valence model best predicted the data. This winning
model enables us to extend ideas derived from financial econom-
ics that individuals respond to risk asmeasured by the variance in
potential outcomes (Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts, 2010), by in-
corporating valence. In the mean–variance–valence model, on
each trial the subjective values, or utilities (U), of both options (A
and B) were computed using the following utility function: U
Mean
 *Variance, where  gain in gain trials and  loss in
loss trials. Here, gain is a free parameter reflecting risk preference
in gain trials and loss reflects risk preference in loss trials. In each
trial, the utilities were then compared to generate a probability of
each action, with a softmax function allowing for noise in action
selection (containing a free parameter ). This winningmodel in
all six datasets explicitly incorporated outcome variance as amet-
ric of risk, which we use in our neuroimaging analysis below.
Model comparison also revealed that our findings were not
explained by effects of choice randomness or probability weight-
ing.With our winningmodel, replacing the single free parameter
in our softmax decision rule () with separate parameters for
gain trials (gain) and loss trials (loss) resulted in worse perfor-
mance with all datasets. Risk-related parameters () from this
winning model and the simpler metric (PropRisk) described
above were very highly correlated for gain and loss trials in all six
datasets (e.g., Experiment 4, gains, r  0.94, p  1.3  1010;
losses, r 0.90, p 7.9 109). Furthermore, it is notable that,
in all six experiments, themean–variance–valencemodel, explic-
Figure 2. Replicating choice behavior. We strikingly replicate the behavioral effects of risk and valence in our further experi-
ments using the accept/reject task (Experiment 3 when participants attended on two days, Experiment 4 using fMRI, and Experi-
ment 5 with a free response time) and using the selection task (Experiment 6 with a free response time). The proportion of riskier
choices overall (i.e., PropRiskall, shown by dotted lines) was similar in all experiments, with risk aversion shown by one-sample t
tests against the null hypothesis of risk neutrality (i.e., PropRiskall, 0.5) in all datasets: Experiment 3, day 1 (t(27)2.2; p
0.039); Experiment 3, day 2 (t(27)4.4; p 0.0005); Experiment 4 (t(21)4.2; p 0.0002), Experiment 5 (t(18)2.83;
p 0.01), and Experiment 6 (t(33)6.17; p 5.9 10
7). Valence also influenced choice, but we again we reversed the
direction of effect between the accept/reject task where individuals gambledmore for gains than losses (Experiments 3, 4, and 5)
and the selection task showing the opposite (Experiment 6). Error bars show SEM. *p 0.05; **p 0.005; ***p 0.00005.
Figure 3. Behavioral model comparison. In all six experiments examined separately, the
mean–variance–valence model best predicted choice. Here, for illustration we show the com-
bined results from the four experiments using the accept/reject task (Experiments 1, 4, 5 and
day 1 in Experiment 3, giving n 85; a); and the combined dataset from Experiments 2 and 6
using the selection task (n 58;b).We plot the summedBIC for eachmodel relative to that for
the worst performing model (mean-only). The effects of risk and valence are seen clearly by
comparing our three related summary statistic models: themean-onlymodel in which individ-
uals care only about the mean value of the options (Mn_Only) is improved by adding the
influence of risk in themean–variancemodel (Mn_Var), which in turn ismarkedly improved by
also accounting for valence in ourmean–variance–valencemodel (Mn_Var_Val) that includes
separate riskparameters for eachvalence. Theexpectedutility (EUT) andprospeticmodels (here
shown with a reference point of zero) also out-perform the mean-only model.
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itly incorporating variance, better pre-
dicted choice than expected utility or
prospect theorymodels (Fig. 3), eitherwhen
the prospetic models used a reference point
of zero or the sure amount. Finally, we note
that in absolute terms our winning mean–
variance–valencemodelwell predicted indi-
viduals’ actual choices: it correctly predicted
76% [8% (SD)] of participants’ choices
(probability of correct choice,0.5) in the
accept/reject task (n  85), and correctly
predicted 76% [6% (SD)] of choices in
the selection task (n 58).
Independent and stable interindividual
differences for risk and valence
We exploited interindividual differences
to seek further evidence of behavioral in-
dependence between the influences of risk and valence. If these
influences result from stable and independent processes, we can
make two predictions: first, within individuals each influence
should be consistent over time; and second, if they are indepen-
dent, then knowing an individual’s sensitivity to one influence
would not predict sensitivity to the other. We tested these con-
jectures in Experiment 3, in which 28 participants performed the
accept/reject task on two separate days (1–3 d apart). We found
behavior on day 1 strongly predicted behavior on day 2 for both
risk (PropRiskall, r 0.77, p 2.1 10
6) and valence (ImpVa-
lence, r 0.84, p 3.3 108; Fig. 4). However, crucially, these
preferences were independent, with risk and valence effects
showing no correlation on either day 1 (r0.021; p 0.92; Fig.
3) or day 2 (r  0.14; p  0.47). This independence was also
evident in our other five datasets (Experiments 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6),
with R2 0.07 in all datasets.
Dissociable neural activity relating to manipulations of risk
and valence
We next used fMRI during our accept/reject task to ask whether
activity in dissociable neural regions corresponded to our exper-
imental manipulations of risk and valence, and to the indepen-
dent preferences shown for each (Experiment 4, n  22). We
implemented a 2 valence (gain, loss)  2 choice (accept, reject)
analysis, with trial-by-trial metrics of risk (measured as the vari-
ance of the lottery) and EV. We report activity whole brain cor-
rected (p 0.05) at the cluster level, unless otherwise stated.
Our data revealed neural activity relating to our experimental
manipulations of both risk and of valence, and that the activity
relating to eachwas neuroanatomically dissociable. The degree of
risk in the lottery positively correlated with activity in posterior
parietal cortex, a region strongly associated with risk (Platt and
Glimcher, 1999; Huettel et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2010), and in
middle temporal gyrus (Fig. 5, Table 1). Our manipulation of
valence was expressed in greater activity for gains than losses in
value-related (O’Doherty, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008) areas of or-
bitofrontal cortex and bilateral striatum (Fig. 5), as well as left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and right posterior insula. Striatal
activity was greatest in bilateral dorsal striatum (Table 1), a pat-
tern previously seen when rewards are action related (O’Doherty
et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004), but also included ventral stria-
tum bilaterally [e.g., Z-score  3.4 bilaterally at peak ventral
striatum coordinates previously reported for positive stimuli in
the study by O’Doherty et al. (2004)]. Furthermore, the neural
regions corresponding to our manipulations of risk and valence
were neuroanatomically dissociable. This was evident by using
exclusive masking with a liberal threshold (p  0.05, uncor-
rected) to show that the risk-related parietal activity still survived
whole-brain correction having removed the valence-related vox-
els by exclusive masking; as was also the case for valence-related
activity in OFC, striatum, and posterior insula having exclusively
masked risk-related voxels.
We next tested for independent interindividual differences for
risk and valence. Greater individual risk aversion (i.e., lower
PropRiskall) predicted enhanced activity when accepting than
when rejecting a risky option, in areas including the risk-related
region of posterior parietal cortex and bilateral anterior insula/
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Fig. 6, Table 2). By contrast, the
more an individual’s choices were influenced by valence (ImpVa-
lence, defined above), the greater the enhancement of valence-
related activity for gains (relative to losses) in right posterior
insula. Again, exclusive masking (liberal threshold of p  0.05,
uncorrected) showed an anatomical dissociation of activity in
these risk- and valence-related regions.
Interestingly, we did not find any activity for losses (relative to
gains) that survived whole-brain correction, and only by taking
anterior insula (Mohr et al., 2010) and amygdala (De Martino et
al., 2006; Guitart-Masip et al., 2010) as a priori regions of interest
did left insula survive small-volume correction. We also note no
activity surviving whole-brain correction correlated with our
parametric manipulation of EV. Only by taking OFC as an a
priori region of interest did we find a positive correlationwith EV
Figure 4. Individuals’ preferences for risk and valence are consistent and independent. In Experiment 3, 28 participants per-
formed the accept/reject task on 2 separate days. We show a striking consistency over days in individual preferences for both risk
(a) (PropRiskall, r 0.77, p 2.1 10
6) and valence (b) (ImpValence, r 0.84, p 3.3 108). However, crucially, these
preferenceswere independent,with risk and valence effects showing no correlation on either day 1 (c) (r0.021; p 0.92) or
day 2 (r 0.14; p 0.47), or in our other five datasets.
Figure 5. Dissociable neural encoding of stimulus risk and valence. Experiment 4 (n 22)
used fMRI of the accept/reject task,which independentlymanipulates thedegreeof risk and the
valence in outcomes. a, For valence, greater activity was seen for gains than losses in orbito-
frontal cortex and bilateral striatum. b, Risk was measured as lottery variance, and this posi-
tively correlatedwith posterior parietal cortex activity. Exclusivemasking shows this activity for
valence and risk was anatomically dissociable (see main text).
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(21 47 8; Z  4.28; 44 voxels at p  0.005, uncorrected; small
volume corrected).
However, although we show above that our manipulations of
risk and valence relate to dissociable neural regions, this does not
preclude different encoding of risk for gain and loss outcomes.
Testing this possibility addresses an important further question,
as although our behavioral model captures the concept that va-
lence changes the impact of risk on choice, how this occurswithin
the process of choice (involving option evaluation and action
selection) cannot be determined from this behavioral model
alone. In fact, the pattern of choices we observe can be explained
by distinct hypotheses: first, in option evaluation valence could
alter the encoding of risk (i.e., valence-dependent risk encoding);
and second, action selection could be influenced by both risk and
valence (e.g., both could be processed separately, involving
valence-independent risk encoding) to give the observed pattern
of choice.
We next asked whether our neural data support valence-
dependent or -independent encoding of risk. By design, our para-
metric manipulation of risk in the gain trials is identical with that
in the loss trials, and this allowed us to directly contrast these
parametric regressors to compute their interaction. This directly
tests for any valence-dependent difference in the strength of the
relationship between risk and neural activity. In this analysis,
there was no interaction in risk-sensitive parietal cortex between
risk encoding for gain compared with loss trials [only 4 of the 316
voxels in the parietal cluster (Table 1) survive even at a liberal
threshold of p  0.01, uncorrected, for either the interaction of
(riskgain  riskloss) or (riskloss  riskgain)]. Furthermore, a con-
junction analysis between activity positively correlating with risk
in the gain and loss trials demonstrated activity in the risk-
Figure 6. Approaching risk and loss: neural data. A possible mechanism by which valence
and risk influence choice is by influencing the disposition to approach economic stimuli. Actions
can be parsed into approach (accept) or avoidance (reject). a, In relation to valence, anterior
insula/IFG demonstrates an interaction of choice (accept, reject) and valence (gain, loss). b
shows this interaction was driven by increased activity when approaching (accepting) the lot-
terywith losses (Lossaccept),whichwas the specific action towhich individualsweremost averse
of the four possible actions in our task (Gainaccept, Gainreject, Lossaccept, Lossreject). Parameter
estimates are taken from the peak for this interaction in right anterior insula/IFG. c, For risk, the
more averse an individual was to risk (i.e., lower PropRiskall), the greater the activity when
approaching (i.e., accepting) the risky option in areas including anterior insula/IFG. d, For illus-
tration, we plot this correlation with risk preference (PropRiskall; risk-neutral, 0.5; risk-averse,
0.5; risk-seeking,0.5) at the peak for this activity in right anterior insula/IFG. Error bars
indicate SEM.
Table 1. fMRI results across subjects
Regions L/R x y z Z No. voxels
Corrected
p value
Gain loss
OFC/rostral ACC R 6 38 8 4.67 876 0.001
6 50 13 4.29
9 38 17 4.22
Striatum L 12 11 22 4.53 680 0.001
24 10 13 3.99
Striatum R 24 11 1 4.18
Posterior insula R 30 22 19 4.29 157 0.008
36 34 16 3.79
39 19 16 3.75
Loss gain Nil
Accept reject
Caudate R 15 17 10 5.65 288 0.001
0 1 16 4.02
6 13 25 3.86
Inferior parietal lobule R 51 34 49 4.62 1539 0.001
45 43 46 4.39
Precuneus 21 73 43 4.06
Superior medial gyrus R 9 32 40 4.15 1226 0.001
24 14 46 4.00
Superior medial gyrus L 3 38 31 4.15
Reject accept Nil
Interaction (gain loss, reject accept)
Pre-SMA R 9 20 61 4.21 285 0.003
3 29 52 3.62
0 32 43 3.58
Anterior insula/IFG R 30 26 8 4.02 97 0.025
27 20 20 3.39
39 20 11 3.38
Interaction (gain loss, accept reject) Nil
Variance (positive correlation)
ITG/MTG R 48 61 8 4.59 155 0.001
54 55 2 4.41
Posterior parietal R 39 82 22 4.48 316 0.001
Superior parietal/precuneus 15 70 55 4.25
33 64 34 4.12
Variance (negative correlation)
Cerebellum L/R 6 76 17 4.84 732 0.001
9 79 26 4.61
6 73 23 4.24
This table shows all activity surviving cluster-level correction across the whole brain ( p 0.05, FWE corrected;
threshold of p 0.005 used to define the clusters) for contrasts involving the following: valence (gain vs loss),
choice (accept vs reject), interaction of choice and valence, positive and negative correlationswith variance, positive
and negative correlations with expected value, and interaction of variance in gains versus losses. For each cluster is
shown the following: the three constituent peaks (8mmapart)with the highest Z-scores, the number of voxels at
p 0.005 (uncorrected), and the p value of the cluster after FWE correction across the whole brain. The striatal
activity for gains losses included both ventral and dorsal striatum bilaterally (details in Results). No regions
survivingwhole-brain correction correlatedwith EV, although activity in OFC positively correlatingwith EV survived
small-volume correction (details in Results). Also, in addition to the whole-brain-corrected results: left anterior
insula showed the same interaction (gain loss, reject accept, x27 y 20 z11; no. voxels, 69) as
right anterior insula,whichwas again drivenby increased activitywhenaccepting the lotterywith losses; andon the
left, this also led to activity for loss gain (x33 y 20 z5; Z 4.13; no. voxels, 51).
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sensitive regions identified by our main analysis (centered on
coordinates 27 70 31 in parietal and 57 58 2 in temporal
cortices, small volume corrected). Thus, our data do not support
valence-dependent risk encoding.
Neural data suggesting risk and loss can influence action
selection through approach–avoidance mechanisms
Showing that stimulus risk and valence involve dissociable neu-
roanatomical regions does not explain how they influence action
selection to influence choice in our accept/reject task. Recent
work suggests choice results from multiple interacting decision
systems (Dayan, 2008), and two of these are potentially relevant
here. These are notmutually exclusive. One possibility is that risk
or valence (or both) influence an individual’s disposition to ap-
proach or avoid stimuli, by acting as appetitive or aversive stim-
ulus features. Such approach–avoidance mechanisms appear to
underlie a variety of biases in humans and animals (Dayan, 2008;
Guitart-Masip et al., 2010). The key feature of neural activity
related to such systems is its contingency upon specific pairings
between stimulus properties and responsive actions (i.e., to ap-
proach appetitive and to avoid aversive stimulus properties). Sec-
ond, risk and valence could modulate the values ascribed to
actions by more sophisticated goal-directed systems, which as-
sign values to actions by computing action–outcome associa-
tions and then evaluating the rewards associated with the
different outcomes to choose between actions (Dayan, 2008). A
central prediction here is a unified utility (or subjective value)
signal that incorporates the stimulus features, in which activity is
not contingent on the particular type of action that brings about
a particular outcome.
Weobservedneural activity consistentwithapproach–avoidance
mechanisms when individuals approached (accepted) the lottery,
for both risk and valence (Fig. 6). With respect to risk, the more
averse an individual was to risk (i.e., lower PropRiskyall), the greater
the activity evoked when approaching (i.e., accepting) the risky op-
tion in areas including anterior insula/IFG (Fig. 6), a region known
to support aversive representations (Calder et al., 2001; Seymour et
al., 2007). In relation to valence, actions canbeparsed into approach
(accept) or avoidance (reject). Of the four possible actions in our
task (Gainaccept, Gainreject, Lossaccept, Lossreject), individuals are
least disposed to choose the lottery with losses. This specific ac-
tion (Lossaccept), to which individuals were most averse, was the
sole action associated with increased anterior insula/IFG activity
(Fig. 6)—leading to an interaction between choice and valence
[(Gainaccept 
 Lossreject)  (Gainreject 
 Lossaccept)] in anterior
insula/IFG, an interaction also seen in presupplementary motor
area (Table 1). Note that this interaction also suggests that the
neural correlates of our experimentalmanipulation of valence are
not only determined by the higher overall value of options in the
gain than loss trials.
Interestingly, we did not find neural evidence surviving
whole-brain correction for a unified value signal, a possibility we
investigated using behavioral-model-derived utilities as para-
metric modulators (using chosen value, or chosenminus uncho-
sen value, or the value of the lottery). However, a more liberal
analysis in a priori value-related regions (OFC, medial PFC, pos-
terior cingulate, and ventral striatum) revealed a positive corre-
lation with chosen minus unchosen value in right ventral
striatum (9 14 5; Z  3.4; 18 voxels; p  0.03, small volume
corrected). Note that the less robust nature of this evidence for
unified utility may be explained by a number of factors (see Dis-
cussion), and we do not claim a system involving unified utility
does not play an important role in this task as one of multiple
contributing decision systems.
Testing behavioral predictions of approach–avoidance
mechanisms
An approach–avoidance mechanism makes specific new behav-
ioral predictions. It is known that individuals are slower to ap-
proach aversive stimuli and are faster to approach appetitive
stimuli (Crockett et al., 2009; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011), mea-
sured using RTs. If risk and valence are indeed such stimulus
features, this makes simple predictions. Regarding valence, indi-
viduals will be slower to approach (choose) options containing
losses than gains. Regarding risk, this stimulus feature can be
aversive, neutral, or appetitive depending on an individual’s risk
preference: thus, we predict that, when risk-averse, individuals
will be slower to approach risk; when risk-neutral, they will show
no RT difference; and when risk-seeking, they will be faster to
approach risk.
In the experiments above, in each trial subjects had an im-
posed evaluation period of 4020ms before acting within 1500ms
(Fig. 1). Here, to test our new predictions, subjects were free to
respond at any pointwithin the 5520ms andundertook either the
accept/reject task (Experiments 5, n  19) or the selection task
(Experiment 6, n 34). In both new experiments, choice behav-
ior precisely replicated that described above (Fig. 2). RTs con-
formed precisely to our predictions for valence (Fig. 7) and risk
(Fig. 8). Valence influenced RTs, with individuals being slower to
choose (approach) options with losses than with gains, both in
the accept/reject task (gains, mean  SD, RT, 2975  574 ms;
losses, 3189 648; t(18) 4.62, p 2.1 10
4) and the selection
task (gains, 2681  472; losses, 3222  525; t(33)  13.04, p 
Table 2. fMRI results between subjects, using second-level covariates related to
risk and valence
Regions L/R x y z Z No. voxels
Corrected
p value
PropRiskall (negative correlation) on accept reject
Inferior parietal lobule L/R 54 43 49 5.20 2328 0.001
Postcentral gyrus 33 70 46 4.67
30 46 43 4.54
Anterior insula/IFG L 42 20 8 5.02 384 0.001
33 20 11 4.76
51 38 1 4.20
Anterior insula/IFG R 39 23 11 4.47 212 0.003
48 23 8 4.47
42 20 2 4.25
Middle frontal gyrus L 30 2 61 4.19 194 0.022
33 16 52 3.97
24 7 49 3.52
Superior medial gyrus L/R 3 29 49 4.17 768 0.001
6 23 43 4.16
51 14 22 4.05
Caudate R 15 7 13 4.06 458 0.001
Thalamus 15 8 13 4.01
9 31 1 3.82
Valence impact (positive correlation) on gain loss
Posterior insula R 39 10 13 4.32 129 0.008
63 19 4 3.87
36 31 16 3.22
This table shows all activity surviving cluster-level correction across the whole brain ( p 0.05, FWE corrected;
threshold of p 0.005 used to define the clusters) for contrasts involving the following: the second-level covariate
for risk (PropRiskall ) on activity for accept reject; and the second-level covariate for valence (ImpValence) on
activity for gain loss. The negative correlation with risk preference (PropRiskall ) indicates greater activity for
accepting (approaching) the lottery with increasing risk aversion. For each cluster is shown the following: the three
constituent peakswith the highest Z-scores; the number of voxels at p 0.005 (uncorrected); and the p value of the
cluster after FWE correction across the whole brain.
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1.4  1014). With risk, as its effect depends on individuals’
subjective preference, we tested between subjects. In the accept/
reject task, individuals’ risk preference with gains (PropRiskgain)
strongly predicted the RT effect when approaching (choosing)
the riskier relative to the surer option (RTriskier  RTsurer) with
gains (r0.89; p 4.2 107); and risk preferencewith losses
(PropRiskloss) strongly predicted the RT effect with losses (r 
0.75; p  2.3  104). In the selection task, we see the same
relationship between risk preference and RT effects with both
gains (r  0.82; p  4.6  109) and losses (r  0.70; p 
4.8 106). Furthermore, the pattern of RT effects was exactly as
predicted: risk slowed approach when risk was aversive, induced
no RT difference when risk was neutral, and speeded approach
when risk was appetitive (Fig. 8).
In light of these findings, we examined the reaction times in
our previous experiments, in which in each trial there was an
imposed evaluation period of 4 s before the 1.5 s choice period
(Fig. 1). We conjectured that, if such RT effects were still seen in
these experiments with an imposed evaluation period, that
within the processes supporting choice this would be more sug-
gestive of these influences affecting action selection rather than
option evaluation. Indeed, our data do show the same RT effects
when approaching risk and valence despite the imposed evalua-
tion period. With respect to valence, individuals were slower to
choose (approach) losses than gains in both the accept/reject task
(Experiment 4: losses, mean  SD, RT, 621  105 ms; gains,
575 87; t(21) 3.16, p 0.005) and the selection task (Exper-
iment 2: losses, 611 135; gains, 531 103; t(23) 6.58, p 1
106). With respect to risk, they show the same RT effects con-
sistent with risk being aversive, neutral, or appetitive (Fig. 8).
The proportion of missed trials was low [2  3% (SD)], and
there was no difference between tasks [accept/reject task, 2 3%
(SD); selection task, 2  3% (SD); independent-samples t test,
t(169) 0.32, p 0.75]. However, in keeping with longer RTs for
loss than gain trials, there was a small increase in missed trials for
losses [3 4% (SD)] relative to gains [2 3% (SD)], shown in a
mixed ANOVA with missed trials as dependent variable (main
effect of valence, F(1,169)  30.9, p  0.001; and no interaction
between task and valence, F(1,169)  3.2, p  0.08). Note that
removing the minority of trials involving lotteries containing
possible zero outcomes (9% in the selection task; 16% in the
accept/reject task in Experiments 1, 4, and 5) does not alter the
findings in any of our datasets with respect to choice (more gam-
bling for gains than losses in the accept/reject task and the reverse
in the selection task; stable and independent interindividual dif-
ferences for risk and valence) or reaction times (effects of risk and
valence).
Finally, our RT data provided an opportunity to test an hy-
pothesis related to the unified utility that may be associated with
more goal-directed mechanisms. Specifically, it might be pre-
dicted that where the utilities of two options become closer that
difficulty (and thusRT)would increase.We tested this by regress-
ingRT against the absolute difference in utility (using behavioral-
model-derived utilities) for each individual subject, and then
bringing the regression coefficients from all individuals up to the
group level where they are treated as a new response variable
(analogous to group analysis in SPM) (Friston, 2004). In both
tasks, with either a free response time or an imposed wait, as
predicted the group mean regression coefficient was negatively
signed (indicating longer RTs with smaller differences in utility),
and one-sample t tests showed these regression coefficients were
significantly different to zero (p 0.001 for each of Experiments
2, 4, 5, and 6).
Discussion
Consistent with our hypothesis that risk and valence indepen-
dently influence choice, we dissociated their effects both by ma-
nipulating task design and also by exploiting interindividual
differences. These dissociations are not predicted by existing the-
ory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). Furthermore, our finding of greater gambling for gains
than losses, not previously reported, is inconsistent with existing
theory that predicts the opposite (Kahneman andTversky, 1979).
However, we can explain these new findings as well as classic
findings (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) within a biologically
grounded, process-based account of choice that evolves from op-
tion evaluation to action selection (Corrado et al., 2009).
Regarding option evaluation, we show that risk and valence in
economic stimuli engage neuroanatomically dissociable regions.
Regarding action selection, our neural data are consistent with
risk and valence in part exerting their influence through ap-
proach–avoidance mechanisms. For risk in particular, this ex-
tends “summary statistic”models of risk evaluation derived from
financial economics (Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts, 2010; Sym-
Figure 7. Approaching loss influences reaction times as predicted by an approach–avoid-
ancemechanism. As predicted by an approach/avoidancemechanism, individuals were slower
to choose (approach) options with losses than with gains in both new experiments with a free
response period: with the accept/reject task (Experiment 5, n 19) (a); andwith the selection
task (Experiment 6, n 34) (b). Strikingly, we also show the same influences in our previous
experimentswith an imposedevaluationperiod, suggesting these influences affectmoreaction
selection than option evaluation: with the accept/reject task (Experiment 4, n 22) (c); and
with the selection task (Experiment 2, n 24) (d). For illustration, RT data is normalized for
each subject. In each experiment, we parse trials into the four possible events: a gain trial and
choose the surer option; a gain trial and choose riskier; a loss trial and choose surer, a loss trial
and they choose riskier. Error bars showSEM. Paired t tests are shown. *p 0.05; **p 0.005;
***p 0.0005.
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monds et al., 2011) and foraging theory
(Stephens and Krebs, 1987), both by in-
corporating valence and linking them to
action selection. Crucially given the corre-
lational nature of fMRI data, this neural
account makes new behavioral predic-
tions that we then confirm experimentally
in valence- and risk-dependent reaction
time effects.
From a biological perspective, that risk
and valence both influence choice is not
unexpected. Risk sensitivity is phylogenti-
cally ancient (Real et al., 1982; Kacelnik
and Bateson, 1996), and there are good
computational reasons why animals
should track risk in natural stochastic en-
vironments (D’Acremont and Bossaerts,
2008). Considerable biological evidence
also exists for reward/punishment asym-
metries (Dayan and Seymour, 2008) with
loss aversion specifically reported in non-
human primates (Chen et al., 2006).
However, within this biological perspec-
tive, there is little that a priori favors the
classically described relationship between
these variables rather than the indepen-
dent influences we show.
Our data also speak to how risk and
valence may influence action selection.
Mounting evidence suggests distinct valu-
ation systems contribute to control of ac-
tion, including both simpler systems that
relate the value of particular states to in-
nate behavioral repertoires like avoidance
(Kim and Jung, 2006; Seymour et al.,
2007) and more sophisticated goal-directed systems that use ex-
plicit models of the environment to select actions (Dayan, 2008).
Our neural and RT data provide evidence that both loss and risk
may in part influence choice via the former, by triggering avoid-
ance or approach responses. In contrast, we do not find similarly
robust neural evidence for the unified utility previously shown
with simpler stimuli (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). One potential
reason is that utility representations of more complex multiat-
tribute stimuli may be distributed, and detectable only using
multivariate but not standard mass univariate analyses (Kahnt et
al., 2011). A further important question is how integration occurs
between the influences of these different stimulus features and
decision systems. Future work might usefully investigate where
integration occurs within the process from action selection to
motor implementation.
Regarding valence, our observation that stimuli containing
loss induce avoidance can explain behavior across a variety of
tasks. Previous work showed that framing a sure option as a loss
biased individuals to avoid that sure option and choose a gamble
instead (De Martino et al., 2006), a bias also elicited by inciden-
tally presenting aversive conditioned stimuli with the sure option
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2010). Avoidance of stimuli containing
losses also explains a disposition not to choose “loss-gain mixed
gambles,” which contain losses along with gains (Tom et al.,
2007). With respect to elements of prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), while our data argues against the “reflection
effect” (i.e., risk seeking with losses and risk aversion with gains),
an approach–avoidance account is in fact consistentwith “loss aver-
sion” where losses have greater weight (“loom larger”) than gains.
Our observation that valence influences approach is also con-
sistent with the context dependence we see for losses, where we
reverse the direction of the loss-induced effect between our ac-
cept/reject and selection tasks. Context powerfully determines
how animals react to aversive stimuli, such that rats in different
contexts may respond to threat by fleeing, freezing, or even fight-
ing (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1988; Dayan and Seymour, 2008).
Although loss induces avoidance in both our tasks, in the
selection task individuals had to select between two lotteries
and so could not express avoidance by withdrawal, but instead
could potentially avoid losses by selecting the riskier (higher
variance) option.We note context effects in the same direction
have been shown for mixed gambles, which when presented as
in our accept/reject task were avoided more often than when
presented as in our selection task (Ert and Erev, 2008). In the
classic paper establishing prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), each problem presented two options for indi-
viduals to select between, leading to the same effect direction
as our selection task.
That valence influences individuals from approaching (ac-
cepting) the lottery with losses in the accept/reject task is consis-
tent with the enhanced anterior insula/IFG activity seen for this
specific action. This is of interest as anterior insula is known to
represent aversion (Calder et al., 2001; Seymour et al., 2007).
Approach–avoidance mechanisms gave predictions that were
confirmed in our RT experiments and explain previously re-
Figure 8. Risk influences RTs and can be aversive, neutral, or appetitive. Risk influenced RTs as predicted by an approach–
avoidance mechanism in both new experiments with a free response period: the accept/reject task (Experiment 5) (a); and the
selection task (Experiment 6) (b). As the effect of risk depends on individuals’ subjective preference, we looked between subjects.
An individual’s risk preferencewith gains strongly predicted their RT effect (RTriskierRTsurer) with gains; and their risk preference
with losses strongly predicted their RT effect with losses. In both tasks, we observe our predicted pattern, in which risk slowed
approach when risk was aversive, risk induced no RT difference when risk was neutral, and risk speeded approach when risk was
appetitive (see e for a diagram illustrating these predictions). We show the same RT effects in our previous experiments with an
imposed evaluation period:with the accept/reject task (Experiment 4) (c); andwith the selection task (Experiment 2) (d). Gains are
in blue, and losses are in red. Regression lines are shown,which are not constrained in anyway. For illustration, gray lines show risk
neutrality in choice (i.e., PropRiskall, 0.5) and no RT difference (i.e., RTriskier RTsurer 0).
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ported longer RTs for losses than gains (Dickhaut et al., 2003).
Our data also argue against the possibility that RT findings arise
from greater computational demands induced by losses, because
we observe the same RT effects even when subjects have an im-
posed evaluation period (Figs. 7, 8), and because the impact of
losses differs between tasks in an action-specific way (Fig. 7).
Furthermore, greater computational difficulty with losses would
not explain our risk-related RT effects (Fig. 8).
Our valence-related neural data help reconcile previously dis-
crepant neural findings.Greater activity for gains than losses in areas
including value-related regions of striatum and orbitofrontal cortex
(O’Doherty, 2004; Tom et al., 2007) may relate to the value differ-
ence between these trial types. However, for loss-related activity,
while some studies report activity in regions associatedwith aversive
processing, such as amygdala (DeMartino et al., 2006) and anterior
insula (Guitart-Masip et al., 2010), others do not (Tom et al., 2007).
Crucially, we show that loss-related activity in anterior insula is
driven by having to approach losses, and this can account for why
such loss-related activity is reported in studies using contrasts that
include choice as a factor (DeMartino et al., 2006; Guitart-Masip et
al., 2010), as in our valence-by-choice interaction. Our finding of
loss-related activity in anterior insula rather than amygdala may re-
flect the involvement of the former in representing more complex
aspects of aversive stimuli (Seymour et al., 2007).
With respect to risk, the overall proportion of riskier choices
was similar in the accept/reject and selection tasks (Figs. 1, 2,
PropRiskall), inwhich by design themagnitudes of the differences
in risk between the two options in the trials was similar. Thus,
regardless of the direction of the valence effect, most individuals
were averse to risk overall. Our data suggest risk may be aversive
or appetitive, which accords with ideas of an important affective
component to this variable (Schonberg et al., 2011).
The degree of stimulus risk was encoded in parietal cortex, a
finding that concurs with single-unit and previous fMRI data
showing enhanced activity during risky decision making (Platt
and Glimcher, 1999; Huettel et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2010; Sym-
monds et al., 2011). Parietal cortex is known to express an inter-
action between number and space (Hubbard et al., 2005),
suggesting this parietal risk representation may reflect the spread
of an outcome distribution. Interestingly, we did not observe this
correlation in insula, previously seenwhen risk ismanipulated by
altering win probability (Preuschoff et al., 2006). Insula has been
associated with multiple aspects of risky decision making (Mohr
et al., 2010), and here our anterior insula data relate to an ap-
proach–avoidance mechanism with risk (Fig. 6).
Finally, we demonstrate stable and independent interindi-
vidual differences for risk and valence, mirrored by dissociable
neural correlates. Stability over time in the impact of loss has not
been previously demonstrated and is interesting given possible
genetic contributions to framing effects (Roiser et al., 2009). Sta-
ble risk preference concurs with work showing stability over
months (Andersen et al., 2008). Functional segregation in insula
for these preferences also accords well with its putative role in
preferences (Singer et al., 2009) and marked functional segrega-
tion seen along its length (Caruana et al., 2011).
In conclusion, we dissociate the influences of risk and valence,
consistent with a hypothesis that each independently influences
choice. We explain these choices, as well as classical findings
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), within a neurobiological ac-
count proceeding from option evaluation (with separable neural
systems tracking risk and loss) to action selection (involving con-
tributions from approach–avoidance mechanisms). For risk, we
extend summary statistic models of risk evaluation derived from
financial economics (Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts, 2010) and for-
aging theory (Stephens and Krebs, 1987), by linking them to
action selection through approach–avoidance mechanisms and
by incorporating valence. More broadly, our account carries im-
plications across the diverse disciplines to which existing theories
have been influentially applied, including the economic (Cam-
erer, 1998), cognitive (De Martino et al., 2006), and political
sciences (Levy, 2003).
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